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Abstract  
 
This paper examines two dimensions of the software piracy-development nexus to 
complement existing formal literature. It empirically assesses the incidence of piracy on the 
Human Development Index (HDI) and its constituents and then the instrumentality of 
Intellectual Property Right (IPR) treaties (laws) in the linkages. An instrumental variable or 
Two-stage least squares is applied on panel of 11 African countries with data for the period 
2000-2010. Three main findings are established: (1) software piracy has a negative incidence 
on inequality adjusted human development; (2) the unappealing effect of piracy on the HDI is 
fuelled by per capita economic prosperity and life expectancy components of human 
emancipation; (3) software piracy increases literacy. Two major policy implications have 
been retained from the findings. Firstly, adherence to international IPRs protection treaties 
(laws) may not impede per capita economic prosperity and could improve life-expectancy. 
Secondly, adoption of tight IPRs regimes may negatively affect human development by 
diminishing the literacy rate and restricting diffusion of knowledge. 
JEL Classification: K42; O34; O38; O47; O57 
Keywords: Software piracy; Human development; Intellectual property rights; Panel data, 
Instrumental variables. 
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1. Introduction  
 
 In recent years, there has been a wide consensus on the key role that Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPRs) protection play on promoting innovation processes and economic 
growth. Recent technological advancements have not only resulted in an increased availability 
of information and technology related products but also in the proliferation of technology 
used to copy or pirate such goods (Andrés & Asongu, 2013a). Thus, efforts are being placed 
on increasing and harmonizing the standards and enforcement of IPRs protection worldwide 
(Asongu, 2013a). Since the concern of solidifying IPRs and curtailing the proliferation of 
pirated goods is particularly pronounced in developing countries, the concern over how this 
will affect economic growth has been widely debated.  
 While some scholars postulate that increased protection of IPRs stimulates economic 
growth and development via the positive impact on factor productivity (see for example, 
Gould & Gruben, 1996; Falvey et al., 2006; Ramello, 2005), some skeptics are of the stance 
that IPRs protection and adherence to international treaties (laws) may impede, rather than 
encourage economic growth in developing countries (Ramello, 2011; Nicita & Ramello, 2007 
)
1
. A great chunk of the opposition to stronger IPRs asserts that because the existing 
technology in developing countries is more imitative and/or adaptive in nature (rather than 
suitable for creation of new innovations) developing countries will be greatly hampered by 
such changes in policy  (Asongu, 2014a, p. 527). Moreover, it is disputed that weaker IPRs 
are necessary (at least on a temporal basis) for developing countries to obtain knowledge 
spillovers essential for growth and development (Asongu, 2014a, p. 527 ).  
                                                 
1
 “The article agrees with the enounced thesis and tries to provide an explanation of it that relates to the fact that 
in specific circumstances property-rights can produce distinct market failures that affect the social cost and can 
consequently prevent attainment of social welfare” (Ramello, 2011, p. 123). Even religious institutions with the 
supreme mission of spreading the Gospel have resorted to copyright for intellectual rents (Carla & Ramello, 
2011). “While property rules reduce transaction costs in the standard case of bilateral monopoly over the 
exchange of information goods, they might increase transaction costs” (Nicita & Ramello,  2007, p. 767). This 
evolution  may be in part be traceable to the phenomenon of ‘causal economic thinking’, highlighted by Fleury 
& Marciano (2013).  
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 In light of the current debate, there is growing importance in the impact of IPRs 
protection on technological advancements, promotion of innovation and economic 
development. Still, whereas the theoretical literature has attempted to tackle this concern, little 
scholarly attention has been paid to the empirical literature.  Accordingly, the bulk of 
empirical studies have examined the socio-economic determinants of piracy in several 
copyright industries (Andrés, 2006a; Banerjee et al., 2005; Bezmen & Depken, 2006; Goel & 
Nelson, 2009; Peitz & Waelbroeck, 2006). 
Recent studies on software piracy can be classified into four main strands, inter alia: 
nexuses with some factors, its determinants, surveys and others. First, the relationship 
between software piracy and the following have been investigated: socio-economic 
development (Banerjee, 2005); influences on software piracy (Bezmen & Depken, 2006);  
technological output (Charoensukmongkol & Elkassabgi, 2011); inequality (Asongu, 2014a; 
Andrés, 2016b); shadow economy (Goel & Nelson, 2012); taxation (Gomes et al., 2014a); 
intellectual rights protection (Hamister & Braunscheidel, 2013; Asongu, 2015); scientific 
publications (Asongu, 2014b); implications for users and software companies (Jamil & Zaki, 
2011); economic wealth and natural culture (Moores, 2008; 2010); Kuznets curves either 
through per GDP (El Harbi et al., 2011) or extended to other determinants of industrialisation 
(Panas & Ninni, 2011); trade liberalisation and corruption (Robertson et al., 2008); per capita 
Gross National Income (Reinig & Plice, 2011) and the  decision to adopt a video game 
console (Goode & Kartas, 2012).  
Second, the determinants of software piracy in: the Far East countries (Chen et al., 
2010); worldwide (Gomes et al., 2013); European countries (Sonmez et al., 2010) as well as 
corrective measures (Theng et al., 2010). Third, surveys of: theoretical and empirical 
literature (Gomes et al., 2014b) and literature around the world (Kariithi, 2011). Fourth, a 
strand on varying other investigations:  major trends in software piracy over the past decade 
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(Yang et al., 2013); comparative studies between Asian and Non-Asian industrialised 
economies (Ding & Liu, 2009) and   the use of new methods like neuro-computational models 
to assess if they outperform statistical techniques of a traditional dimension (Mostafa, 2011). 
In light of the above, there is scanty empirical literature on the effect of software on 
software piracy on economic growth (Asongu, 2013a, 2015; Andrés & Asongu, 2013ab; 
Bezmen and Depken, 2004; Goel and Andrés, 2012).  Moreover, research on the influence of 
software piracy on an expanded conception of socioeconomic progress such as human 
development is clearly missing. Hence, the aim of this paper is to contribute to existing 
literature on software piracy in the following ways. (1) Assess the incidence of software 
piracy on human development and its constituents at the macro level.  As far as we know, the 
rate of piracy can be seen more generally to proxy for piracy of other goods (books, sound 
recording, and motion pictures). In the process, we also examine which components of the 
inequality adjusted human development (IHDI) later in the investigated relationship. (2) 
Given the debate over whether adherence to international treaties (laws) may impede, rather 
than encourage economic growth in developing countries, this paper assesses how IPR treaties 
(laws) are instrumental in the effect of software piracy on the IHDI and its components.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides existing theory 
and empirical evidence. Data and methodology are discussed and outlined respectively in 
Section 3. The empirical analysis is covered in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2. Theory and empirical evidence 
 
2.1 Piracy and development 
 
 In line with Bezmen & Depken (2004), there are two main avenues along which IP 
and the strength of IPRs regimes are thought to influence the level of economic growth and 
development. The first captures the extent to which IPRs influence the creation of new 
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knowledge and information within individual nations, as well as the diffusion of existing 
knowledge across countries. The second is the indirect effect of a nation’s IPR regime on 
international transactions
2
 that provide factors imperative to the growth process.   
2.1.1 Creation and dissemination of information 
 
 IPRs protection could be traced to the foundation of endogenous theories of economic 
growth in which investment in research and development (R&D) results in profit (returns) to 
individual investors and also increases society’s stock of knowledge. By lowering the cost of 
future innovation, the accumulation of knowledge fosters economic growth (Romer, 1990; 
Grossman & Helpman, 1991). Fundamentally, the wisdom of tighter and more restrictive 
IPRs is premised on the notion that protection of IPRs serves as a stimulus to growth by 
encouraging innovations and inventions. It is only natural that individuals engage in 
innovative activities in response to expected payments for their efforts. As claimed by 
Bezmen & Depken (2004) from Baumol (1993), “this expectation is the primary motivation 
for entrepreneurial activity, increasing total factor productivity, and culminating in increased 
levels of output” (p. 5).  
 Patent holdings and R& D expenditures are more concentrated in the industrialized 
world and enforcement costs are positively associated with the tightening of IPRs. Hence 
stronger IPRs may increase gains (in the form of royalties) to developed countries (and the 
creators of technological advancements) at the expense of developing countries. In the same 
line of argumentation, some authors argue that net consumers of technological innovation 
have an incentive to enforce IPRs only when the innovation they consume differs from the 
type of innovation they supply to foreign markets (Diwan & Rodrick, 1991). It follows that 
the effectiveness of IPRs may be greatly dependent on the country’s present stage of 
development. Strict IPRs regimes may restrict diffusion of knowledge and technological 
                                                 
2
 For example international trade flows, technology transfers and foreign direct investment.  
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development in ‘technology followers’ while at the same time stimulating innovation in 
‘technology leaders’ (Bezmen & Depken, 2004).  
 Traditionally, industrialized nations have depended fairly heavily on the protection 
offered by IPRs. In contrast, less developed countries have often preferred rapid 
dissemination of knowledge at the cost of protecting the IPRs of foreigners. Recently, many 
newly industrialized countries have pushed for stronger IPRs through bilateral, multilateral 
and regional arrangements. This difference in approach might be attributed to the desire of 
developing countries to specialize in labor intensive production of agricultural industries. 
These industries until very recently have largely been supported by public expenditures on 
research and technology and have greatly benefited from shared knowledge spillovers. One 
application of this argument gaining widespread attention is the access to and affordability of 
life-saving drugs, especially with regard to the treatment of HIV/AIDS in developing 
countries. Immense pressure is being placed on pharmaceutical companies to ‘loosen’ their 
patent rights in order to allow poor countries the opportunity of better managing the AIDS 
pandemic.   
2.1.2 International effects 
 
Borrowing from Bezmen & Depken (2004), IPRs may also affect a nation’s growth 
and development process through their influence on a nation’s ability to engage in 
international transactions (e.g. trade, FDI flows and technology transfers). The potential 
growth rewards resulting from increased participation in international trade are well 
understood. It is generally accepted for instance that international trade can be an important 
stimulus to economic prosperity because access to world markets could spur greater 
utilization of idle human capital resources (Todaro & Smith, 2003). The endogenous growth 
theories argue that openness facilitates transmission of technology by providing contact with 
foreign counterparts and, directs domestic resources towards more research intensive sectors 
8 
 
and increases market size knowledge (see Rivera Batiz & Romer, 1991). Nevertheless, these 
models do not necessarily predict that openness leads to economic growth for all countries 
and all circumstances. The theoretical prediction depends on country specific conditions.  A 
stronger IPRs regime may also prove to be a crucial factor in attracting inflows of FDI and 
technological transfers. More so, individual (investors and firms) perceptions regarding the 
strength of a nation’s IPRs regime positively affects such nations’ receipts of FDI and the 
willingness of foreigners to transfer newer technologies (Lee & Mansfield, 1996). Smith 
(2001) also finds a positive correlation between the sales of US affiliates and the strength of 
intellectual property rights protection in a host country. Moreover some authors have argued 
that a weak system of IPRs protection deters FDI in high technology sectors where IPRs play 
a key role (Smarzynska, 2004). It has also been established that stronger IPRs have a positive 
incidence on a nation’s level of exports (Maskus & Penubarti, 1995; Smarzynska, 2004) and 
increases the likelihood of investment undertaken by multinational enterprises (Mansfield, 
1994; Seyoum, 1996). One the other hand, stronger IPRs protection could also reduce the 
need for FDI (Yang & Maskus, 2001).  
Like in the arguments in favor of lowered IPRs in certain pharmaceutical cases, access 
to productive computer software might have significant public good effects (Bezmen & 
Depken, 2004). As recently shown by Asongu (2014a, p. 526), software piracy could be good 
for the poor by mitigating inequality; hence positively contributing to inequality adjusted 
human development. Whether a piracy-instrumented
3
  impact on the IHDI and its constituents 
could yield similar trends remains an empirical question this paper seeks to address.  
2.2 Bases for instrumental variables  
  
In this section, we devote space to providing theoretical justification for the empirical 
validity of the instruments. This justification is very crucial for the relevance of the empirical 
                                                 
3
 Using IPR laws (treaties) as instrumental variables.  
9 
 
analysis because a theoretical basis for the instruments is required for sound and consistent 
interpretation of estimated coefficients. In other words, the object of this paper is not only to 
assess the impact of piracy on human development, it also indirectly aims to examine how IP 
laws (treaties) are instrumental in the incidence of piracy on the IHDI. For clarity in 
presentation, the elucidation is in two main strands: the first strand providing a theoretical 
linkage between IPRs laws (treaties), piracy and human development; and the second strand 
justifying the instrumentality  of income-levels, legal-origin and press-freedom quality.  
In the first strand, logic and common-sense have it that piracy and IPRs protection 
move hand in glove. Accordingly, we cannot talk about one without the other. Hence only 
with the recognition and upholding of IPRs can ‘piracy’ be conceived and defined as a 
scourge to human development. The promulgation and enforcement of laws protecting IP is 
today an international concern owing to globalization and advancements in information and  
communication technologies (ICTs) that have rendered the dissemination of information and 
knowledge less subject to ‘real sector’ scrutiny as in the past decades. The most widely 
known government and international instruments in the fight against piracy are: main IP law, 
IP rights law, World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) treaties and Multilateral 
(Bilateral) treaties. These are the IP laws (treaties) we shall use as instruments in the empirical 
section of the paper. 
In the second strand, we provide theoretical justification for the choice of income-
levels, legal-origin and press-freedom quality instrumental variables. (1) From an income-
level perspective, high-income countries inherently have tighter IPRs and higher human 
development in comparison to their low-income counterparts (Markus, 2000).  Legal-origins 
inherently differ in the emphasis they place on private property rights vis-à-vis the powers of 
the state (La Porta et al., 1998; Beck et al., 2003). The theoretical underpinnings linking 
press-freedom to IPRs is mixed at best. Fundamentally, high-income countries with high 
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press-freedom qualities have been associated with more stringent IPR regimes. However 
today with globalization, ICTs and the Chinese model
4
, the paradigm is being shifted as high 
growth and human development could be associated with low press-freedom and less tight 
IPRs regimes.  
 
2.3 Scope and positioning of the paper 
 Many authors have examined determinants of the willingness and/or ability to pirate 
software by assessing the socio-economic factors that influence piracy. Strong conclusions 
have been drawn that nations with higher income and greater individualism have lower piracy 
rates (Husted, 2000; Marron & Steel, 2000, Depken & Simmons, 2004). Kranenberg & 
Hogenbirk (2005) have concluded that country-specific risk profiles predominantly explain 
software piracy in most industries. Albeit they find that countries with their own copyright 
protection system have significantly less piracy. Gould & Gruben (1996) have noticed a 
positive (negative) linkage between IPRs protection and national growth rates in open 
(closed) economies. This finding has been supported by Rushing & Thompson (1996, 1999) 
and Park & Ginarte (1997) from wealth-threshold and indirect standpoints respectively. Some 
studies have established the existence of a non-linear relationship between income-levels and 
IPRs (Kim, 2004; Maskus & Penubarti, 1995). A substantial bulk of recent empirical 
literature has also focused on the socio-economic determinants of piracy rates in several 
copyright industries (Andrés, 2006a; Banerjee et al., 2005; Bezmen & Depken, 2006; Peitz & 
Waelbroeck, 2006; Goel & Nelson, 2009; Andrés & Goel, 2012). Two issues result from 
above studies: there is a missing human development component and but for a few exceptions 
(Andrés & Goel, 2012 for instance) endogeneity and the instrumentality of IP laws (treaties) 
in the piracy-development nexus are missing.  
                                                 
4
 Consistent with Asongu & Aminkeng (2013), the Chinese model is characterised by state regulation and 
prudence in privatisation/liberalisation policies.  
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 In light of above, the present paper is positioned on three pillars that merit elucidation 
to complement existing literature. Firstly, while a lot has been discussed on the socio-
economic effects of piracy, little is known about the human development component. The 
introduction of this previously missing component will beef-up the literature on two counts: 
(1) using the most recent HDI first published in 2010 that has been adjusted for inequality 
corrects past works (that might have escaped our attention in the literature review) of the bulk 
of criticisms inherent in the first index; (2) the incidence of piracy on the IHDI is 
complemented with effects on constituents of the IHDI. Secondly, a corollary to the first 
motivation drawn from the literature derives from the postulation that; ‘IPRs are thought to be 
successful at spurring economic growth and activity only after a nation has acquired or 
accumulated sufficient human capital and technology infrastructure for creative imitation to 
take place’ (Asongu, 2015, p. 11) (Also see: Maskus & Penubarti, 1995; Kim, 2004; Bezmen 
& Depken, 2004). Hence, the need to assess if this hypothesis is still relevant with respect to 
human development and updated data. Thirdly, the exclusive focus on Africa draws on the 
debate over the ‘East Asian Miracle’5. While Nelson & Pack (1999) have postulated that the 
productive assimilation of existing (foreign) productive techniques and technologies ‘was a 
critical component of the success of these countries’ (see Asongu, 2015, p.10), Maskus (2000) 
cautions that weaker protection of IPRs will not necessarily be beneficial for developing 
countries because it may cause them to remain dependent on older and less efficient 
technologies (Asongu, 2015). This debate merits examination in the context of Africa with 
respect to human development. 
 
                                                 
5
 Additional support for the possibility that the changing strength of IPR regimes is based on a nation’s level of 
development or current technological ability is found in the rapid growth witnessed by South-East Asia. Some 
evidence suggests that the “East Asian Miracle” could have been caused by weaker IPRs regimes at the early 
stages of these nations’ development in addition to their accumulation of capital. These nations’ capacity to 
absorb, replicate, and duplicate foreign innovations may have contributed to their relatively high growth rates. It 
has been further noted that as these countries became significant producers of new technologies and innovators, 
their IPR regimes tightened. 
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3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Data 
 
3.1.1 Measuring piracy 
 
Consistent with  previous empirical studies (Asongu (2015) among others from SIIA 
(2000), software piracy is defined as “the unauthorized copying of computer software which 
constitutes copyright infringement for either commercial or personal use” (p.12). Due to 
software piracy potentially taking place in many avenues – e.g., organized copiers, piracy by 
individuals and commercial or business piracy– obtaining an accurate measure of the 
prevalence of software piracy remains a challenge. There are many types of piracy. According 
to the Business Software Alliance (BSA), we can distinguish among: 1) end user copying; 2) 
downloading; and 3) counterfeiting. The level of piracy is computed as the difference in 
demand for new software applications (estimated from PC shipments) and the legal supply of 
software.  In our paper, the measure of piracy employed is the percentage of software 
(primarily business software) in a country that is illegally installed (without a license) 
annually and is taken to capture the level of software piracy. This variable is reported in 
percentages, ranging from zero % (no piracy) to 100 % (i.e., all software installed is pirated). 
Piracy rates are obtained from the Business Software Alliance, (BSA), (2007), (refer to 
Business Software Alliance (2009) for measurement details).
6
  BSA is an industry group; 
nevertheless its data on software piracy, is the best cross-country measure currently available, 
though subject to some inherent upward bias.
7
  The data on software piracy may be seen more 
broadly as proxying for the extent of digital piracy.  The mean level of piracy rate in the 
                                                 
6
  The BSA data primarily measures the piracy of commercial software.  We are unaware of any publicly 
available cross-national data on end-user software piracy.  See Png (2010) for a discussion about the reliability 
of piracy data. Also see Traphagan & Griffith (1998). 
7
  Among the many researchers that have used this data are Andrés (2006a), Banerjee et al. (2005), Goel & 
Nelson (2009) and Marron & Steel (2000). 
 
13 
 
sample was 60.5 percent, with the minimum piracy rate of 21 percent and a maximum piracy 
rate of 94.3 percent. 
3.1.2 Human development, control and instrumental variables  
 
Borrowing from recent African development literature (Asongu, 2013bc), the paper 
uses the HDI (adjusted for inequality) as a proxy for human development. In a bid to obtain 
more robust results and capture specific human development channels of piracy, the IHDI is 
decomposed into its constituents of literacy; life expectancy and per capita economic 
prosperity. Therefore four endogenous variables will be used in the analysis. These indicators 
are from the World Bank Development (WBD) Indicators. It should be noted that while the 
IHDI was first published in 2010; the algorithm for its calculation has been used to adjust 
historical data up to the year 1970.  
 Control variables include: population growth, financial depth, gross domestic savings, 
development assistance  and democracy. While the first is in annual growth rate, but for the 
democracy index, the rest are in annual percentage of GDP.  The choice of only five control 
variables is contingent on constraints in the Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) test for 
instrument validity
8
.  
Instrumental variables entail: Main Intellectual Property Law, Intellectual Property 
Rights Law, WIPO Treaties, Multilateral Treaties, Bilateral Treaties, Income-levels, Legal-
origin and Press-freedom quality. We have already provided theoretical justification for the 
bases of these instruments in Section 2.2. Beside the fact that ‘IPR laws (treaties) instruments’ 
fall within the framework of an original contribution in this paper, the other instrumental 
variables have been largely documented in the development (Beck et al., 2003; Stulz, & 
Williamson, 2003) and recent African growth (Agbor, 2011; Asongu, 2013bc) literature. The 
                                                 
8
 An OIR test is only possible in the presence of overidentification. That is, the instruments must be higher than 
the number of endogenous explaining variables by at least one degree of freedom. In the cases of exact 
identification (instruments equal to endogenous explaining variables) and under identifications (instruments less 
than endogenous explaining variables) an OIR test is by definition not possible.  
14 
 
imperative for employing IPRs instrumental variables is further justified by differing levels in 
software piracy across African countries (see. Asongu, 2015, p. 5-6). The differing piracy 
levels also reflect varying institutional capacities to address the problem.  
Due to constraints in data availability, the data include a panel of annual observations 
from 11 African countries for the years 2000-2010. The sample is limited because the 
software piracy data is only available for this number of countries on annual basis. Details 
about the variable definitions and data sources (Appendix 3), summary statistics with 
presentation of countries (Appendix 1) and correlation analysis showing the basic correlations 
between key variables used in this paper (Appendix 2) are presented in the appendices. 
 
3.2 Methodology  
 
3.2.1 Endogeneity  
 
 While piracy could be exogenous to human development, the reverse effect cannot be 
ruled-out, as human development engenders more respect for IPRs. As sustained by Bezmen 
& Depken (2004), studies investigating the piracy-development nexus are subject to potential 
endogeneity problems, because it is likely that a nation’s level of development is a crucial 
factor in its choice of or adherence to a particular IPR regime. This confirms an earlier study 
by Ginarte & Park (1997) who found strong evidence that the level of economic development 
explains the strength of patent protection provided by individual countries. We are therefore 
confronted here with an issue of endogeneity owing to reverse-causality since the piracy 
indicators are correlated with the error term in the equation of interest. Beside the reverse-
causality,  the human development indicator (adjusted for inequality) is subject to omitted 
variables that also cause endogeneity. The HDI consists of three components: life expectancy, 
income and literacy. However we know from reality that human development is a 
multidimensional and complex phenomenon, with quantitative and qualitative aspects. To 
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tackle this endogeneity concern, we shall assess its presence with the Hausman test before 
employing an estimation technique relevant to the outcome of the test.  
 
3.2.2 Estimation technique  
 
 Borrowing from Beck et al. (2003) and recent African development literature (Asongu, 
2013bc), the paper adopts a Two-Stage Least Squares (henceforth 2SLS) or Instrumental 
Variable (IV) estimation technique. IV estimation tackles the puzzle of endogeneity and thus 
avoids the inconsistency of estimated coefficients by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) when the 
exogenous variables are correlated with the error term in the main equation. In accordance 
with the literature (Beck et al., 2003), the  2SLS estimation will entail the following steps: 
First-stage regression:  
 
 itiit sInstrumentPiracy )(10  it                       (1)             
                               
                                                                  
Second-stage regression: 
 
 itit PiracyHD )(10  itiX   it                 (2)                                                                                        
 
In Eq. (2), X is a set of control variables while HD denotes the human development 
indicator. For the first and second equations,  v  and u, respectively represent the error terms. 
Instrumental variables are: Main Intellectual Property Law, Intellectual Property Rights Law, 
WIPO Treaties, Multilateral Treaties, Bilateral Treaties, Income-levels, Legal-origin and 
Press-freedom quality.  
We adopt the following steps in the analysis: (1) justify the choice of a 2SLS over an 
OLS estimation technique with the Hausman-test for endogeneity; (2) verify the instruments 
are exogenous to the endogenous components of explaining (piracy channel) and control 
variables; (3) ensure the instruments are valid and not correlated with the error-term in the 
main equation with an Over-identifying Restrictions (OIR) test.  Further robustness check will 
be ensured with robust Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation (HAC) standard errors.   
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4. Empirical analysis 
 
This section aims to examine three main issues: (1) the ability of the instruments to 
explain the endogenous components of the piracy channel and control variables; (2) the 
capacity of the exogenous components of the piracy channel to explain human development 
dynamics and; (3) the ability of the instruments to explain human development dynamics 
beyond the piracy channel. While the first issue is addressed with the first-stage regressions, 
the second and third concerns are tackled with the second-stage regressions.  
4.1 Presentation of results 
 
Table 1 below summarizes first-stage regressions in which the piracy indicator and 
second-stage control variables are regressed on the instrumental variables.  This is the first 
condition for the 2SLS estimation where-in the instruments must be correlated with the piracy 
channel and second-stage control variables. The findings overwhelmingly demonstrate that 
the instruments taken together enter significantly at the 1% level (Fisher statistics). Hence the 
instruments are strong, indicating distinguishing sampled countries by IP laws (treaties), 
income-levels, legal-origin and press-freedom quality help explain cross-country differences 
in piracy and control variables. On a specific note, the following could be established. (1) 
With the exception of IPRs law, other IP laws (treaties) mitigate the rate of piracy. (2) Piracy 
decreases with income-levels. (3) The incidence of the instruments on second-stage control 
variables is overwhelmingly significant and most estimated coefficients have the rights signs. 
For instance, financial depth and savings increase with income-level (Beck, 1999; Asongu, 
2013d); with the exception of IPRs law and bilateral agreements, mainstream IP treaties 
(WIPO and Multilateral) exert a positive incidence on democracy. Discussing linkages 
between the instruments and ‘second-stage control variables’ to elaborate detail will be space 
consuming and out of scope since the object of this section is simply to demonstrate that the 
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instruments are strong, by providing evidence that they are correlated with the endogenous 
components of the second-stage exogenous variables.  
Table 1: First-stage regressions  
 Dependent Variables 
 Piracy Finance Population Democracy Foreign-aid Savings 
Constant  1.090*** -0.450*** 5.993*** 6.199*** 32.925*** 35.493*** 
 (8.485) (-5.512) (26.61) (8.816) (5.552) (11.17) 
MIPLaw -0.070*** -0.007 0.152*** 0.013 -0.094** -1.482*** 
 (-10.19) (-1.219) (55.31) (0.742) (-2.056) (-7.898) 
IPrlaw 0.070* -0.079** -0.007 -0.480*** 0.291 2.362** 
 (1.870) (-2.230) (-0.550) (-11.16) (1.582) (2.019) 
Wipo Treaties  -0.036** 0.048*** 0.179*** 0.434*** -4.058*** -2.053* 
 (-2.431) (2.747) (3.382) (2.732) (-2.941) (-1.783) 
Multilateral  -0.028* 0.047*** -0.014*** 0.103*** -0.118 -1.689*** 
 (-1.867) (3.236) (-2.972) (3.902) (-0.875) (-2.954) 
Bilateral  0.070 0.011 0.286*** -6.524*** -9.440*** 5.275* 
 (0.627) (0.129) (2.955) (-23.90) (-4.283) (1.935) 
LM Income  0.208* -0.420*** 1.807*** -4.188*** -3.489** -13.401*** 
 (1.880) (-3.791) (42.60) (-19.93) (-2.577) (-3.575) 
M. Income -0.257*** 0.496*** -1.230*** 3.679*** -5.162*** 12.396*** 
 (-2.796) (7.314) (-15.92) (19.34) (-2.870) (5.068) 
English  -0.054* 0.175*** 0.746*** -2.705*** -9.449*** --- 
 (-1.911) (4.283) (21.37) (-22.54) (-10.31)  
Freedom  -0.103 0.013 0.248*** 0.767*** -8.435*** -2.316 
 (-1.047) (0.209) (2.802) (3.281) (-3.778) (-0.764) 
       
Adjusted R² 0.882 0.902 0.980 0.881 0.680 0.716 
Fisher 50.001*** 74.420*** 403.70*** 59.418*** 17.837*** 20.314*** 
Observations 72 72 72 72 72 72 
       
*;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. MIPLaw: Main Intellectual Property Law. IPrlaw: Intellectual 
Property Rights Law. Wipo Treaties: World Intellectual Property Organization Treaties. LM: Lower Middle. M. Middle. t-
statistics in brackets.  
 
4.2 Two-stage least squares  regressions  
 
4.2.1 Presentation of results 
 
This section investigates the second and third issues: the ability of the exogenous 
components of the piracy channel to explain human development dynamics conditional of 
other covariates (control variables); and the capacity of the instruments to explain human 
development dynamics beyond the piracy channel. To makes these assessments we use the 
2SLS with IP laws (treaties), income-levels, legal-origin and press freedom qualities as 
instrumental variables.  
Whereas the second issue is addressed by the significance and signs of estimated 
coefficients, the third concern is solved with the OIR-Sargan test. The null hypothesis of this 
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test is the stance that the instruments explain human development dynamics only through the 
piracy and control variable channels. Hence a rejection of this null hypothesis is a rejection of 
the view that the instruments do not explain human development beyond the piracy 
mechanism (conditional on control variable channels). A Hausman test is performed before 
the 2SLS approach is adopted. The null hypothesis of this test is the stance that estimated 
coefficients by OLS are efficient and consistent. Thus a rejection of this null hypothesis points 
to the concern of endogeneity due to inconsistent estimates and hence lends credit to the 
choice of the IV estimation technique. For all models under consideration we find significant 
evidence of endogeneity and proceed with the IV estimation. While the 2
nd
 to the 5
th
 column 
of Table 2 presents results without HAC standard errors, estimates from the 6
th 
to the 9
th
 
column have standard errors that are HAC consistent. In the regressions:  we first of all 
regress the HDI on piracy  to obtain a general trend on how IPRs protection play-out on 
human emancipation (adjusted for inequality);  then we decompose the HDI into its 
constituent elements and further assess the incidence of piracy on each distinct component in 
order to reveal specific human development transmission mechanisms.  
 As concerns the second issue, the following could be drawn. (1) Piracy has a negative 
incidence on inequality adjusted human development. (2) The unappealing effect of piracy on 
the HDI is fuelled by the ‘GDP per capita’ and ‘life expectancy’ components of human 
emancipation. Hence it could be inferred from the first establishment that piracy mitigates 
human development through per capita economic prosperity and life expectancy. (3) Piracy 
increases the literacy rate. This linkage is logical from common-sense and to some extent 
economic theory since the imposition of IPRs severely limits the free dissemination of 
knowledge to the poor and uneducated who cannot afford the high cost of scholarly material. 
(4) Most of the control variables are significant with the right signs: foreign-aid exhibits 
reverse economics (Asongu, 2013c) and; population growth has a negative incidence on GDP 
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per capita growth, especially when the population growth rate is higher than the GDP growth 
rate (as it is the case of most African countries). (5) Findings without HAC standard errors on 
the first part of the table are robust to HAC standard error estimates in the second half of the 
table.  
 Looking at the third concern, overwhelming failure to reject the null hypothesis of the 
OIR test points to validity of the instruments; since they are strictly exogenous and not 
correlated with the error term in Eq. (2), hence they do not suffer from endogeneity. In other 
words, the instruments explain the HDI and its dynamics through no other mechanisms other 
than the piracy channel (conditional on the control variables). The validity of the instruments 
is consistent with robust HAC standard error regressions.  
 
Table 2: Two-stage regressions 
  Dependent Variables 
   Regressions without  HAC standard errors  Regressions with HAC standard errors  
  IHDI GDPpcg LifeExp Literacy  IHDI GDPpcg LifeExp Literacy  
Constant  73.631** 8.576*** 2.688*** -4.313* 73.631*** 8.576*** 2.688*** -4.313*** 
 (2.493) (6.149) (12.87) (-1.679) (2.941) (5.335) (16.08) (-4.040) 
Piracy  -62.18*** -0.926*** -0.055** 0.674* -62.18*** -0.92*** -0.055** 0.674*** 
 (-6.636) (-5.420) (-2.166) (1.778) (-12.24) (-3.870) (-2.016) (3.967) 
Finance  -46.50*** -0.995** -0.010 1.660** -46.50*** -0.995** -0.010 1.660*** 
 (-3.343) (-2.511) (-0.170) (2.442) (-4.692) (-2.555) (-0.183) (6.028) 
Population growth -2.926 -0.587*** -0.114*** 0.684** -2.926 -0.58*** -0.114*** 0.684*** 
 (-0.937) (-3.879) (-5.056) (2.338) (-1.023) (-3.164) (-6.127) (5.561) 
Democracy  0.022 --- --- --- 0.022 --- --- --- 
 (0.031)    (0.033)    
Foreign-aid  -0.213 -0.044*** -0.004*** -0.001 -0.213 -0.04*** -0.004*** -0.001 
 (-0.544) (-5.459) (-3.353) (-0.260) (-1.315) (-13.73) (-12.02) (-0.892) 
Savings  --- 0.004 -0.005*** 0.023*** --- 0.004 -0.005*** 0.023*** 
  (0.739) (-6.205) (3.567)  (1.052) (-11.59) (9.476) 
         
Hausman  190.66*** 268.23*** 60.758*** 89.703*** 190.66*** 268.2*** 60.75*** 89.70*** 
         
Sargan OIR  3.898 5.155 4.325 3.889 3.898 5.155 4.325 3.889 
 [0.272] [0.160] [0.228] [0.273] [0.272] [0.160] [0.228] [0.273] 
Adjusted R² 0.632 0.886 0.885 0.431 0.632 0.886 0.885 0.431 
Fisher 20.123*** 78.299*** 72.469*** 7.537*** 154.12*** 6942 292.2*** 230.48*** 
Observations 54 50 50 41 54 50 50 41 
         
Instruments Constant; Main_IP_law;  IP_rlaw;  Wipo_treaties; Mutilateral; Bilateral; LM_Income;  
M_Income; FreeD; English  
         
IHDI: Inequality adjusted Human Development Index. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. LifeExp: Life Expectancy. Finance: 
Financial depth. GDPpcg: Log of GDP  per capita(constant 2005). *;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions.  [] :P-values. z-statistics in brackets. HAC: Heteroscedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent standard errors. 
 
 
20 
 
4.2.2 Further discussion of results and policy implications  
 Before embarking on further discussion of results, it is worthwhile highlighting the 
intuition motivation this paper. Its object has been to assess the incidence of piracy (IPRs 
protection) on human development. In other terms, we have sought to examine how  IP laws 
(treaties), multi(bi)lateral treaties, income-levels, legal origin and press-freedom qualities are 
instrumental in the incidence of piracy on human development. In a bid to obtain relevant and 
more targeted policy implications, we have decomposed the IHDI into its constituent elements 
and independently assessed the impact of piracy on each component. Three main findings 
have been established: (1) piracy has a negative incidence on inequality adjusted human 
development; (2) the unappealing effect of piracy on the IHDI is fuelled by the ‘GDP per 
capita’ and ‘life expectancy’ components of human emancipation; (3) piracy increases the 
literacy rate. The third point is consistent with Asongu (2014b) which has concluded that 
piracy in software boosts scientific publications in African countries.  
 Two major policy implications could be retained from the findings. (1) Adherence to 
international IPRs protection treaties (laws) may not impede per capita economic prosperity 
and could improve life-expectancy. Hence results on GDP per capita and life expectancy lend 
credit to Maskus (2000) who cautions that weaker protection of IPRs will not necessarily be 
beneficial to developing countries as it may cause them to remain dependent on older and less 
efficient technologies. While from our empirical justification this theory could be valid for 
GDP per capita growth, its ‘life expectancy’ interpretation must be treated with extreme 
caution. Why? HIV/AIDs is a fundamental cause of mortality in the sampled countries and a 
growing chunk of the opposition to stronger IPRs assert ‘permission’ should be granted to 
enable ‘copying’ the life-saving pharmaceuticals; especially those used in the management of 
HIV/AIDS in developing countries most affected and least likely to afford such treatments. 
Their thesis has been premised on the reality that existing technology in African countries is 
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more imitative and adaptive in nature, rather than suitable for creation of new innovations. 
This cautious note is also based on the fact that the sampled countries do not significantly 
represent the entire African continent. (2) Adherence to international IPRs protection treaties 
(laws) may negatively affect human development by diminishing the literacy rate. We have 
found evidence that piracy improves literacy, thus confirming the postulations of Nelson & 
Pack (1999) that the productive assimilation of existing (foreign) productive techniques and 
technologies ‘was a critical component of the success of Asian countries’. Hence we 
recommend adherence to less strict IPR laws (treaties) in the educational sector. This position 
supports the growing preference of multilateral and bilateral IPR laws (treaties) by developing 
countries in the stead of more stringent international IPR laws (treaties) which restrict 
diffusion of knowledge. As nations grow in capacities to become significant contributors to 
knowledge and educational innovations, they could adhere to tighter IPR regimes.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The present paper has been supported by three pillars that merit elucidation to 
complement existing literature. Firstly, while a lot has been discussed on the socio-economic 
effects of piracy, little is known about the human development component. The introduction 
of this previously missing component has beefed-up the literature on two counts: (1) the use 
of the most recent Human Development Index (HDI) first published in 2010 that has been 
adjusted for inequality  corrects past works (that have escaped our attention in the literature 
review) of the bulk of criticisms inherent in the first index; (2) the impact of piracy on the 
HDI  has been complemented with its (piracy) incidence on constituents of the HDI in a bid to 
capture piracy channels to human development which have provided the much needed 
guidance to policy makers. Secondly, a corollary to the first motivation drawn from the 
literature derives from the assertion that; IPRs are thought to be successful at spurring 
economic growth and activity only after a nation has acquired or accumulated sufficient 
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human capital and technology infrastructure for creative imitation to take place (Maskus & 
Penubarti, 1995; Kim, 2004; Bezmen & Depken, 2004). Hence there has been a  need to 
assess if this hypothesis is still relevant with respect to human development and updated data. 
Thirdly, the exclusive focus on Africa has drawn on the debate over the ‘East Asian Miracle’. 
 Owing to above motivations, the paper has sought to examine two dimensions to 
complement existing literature; (1) assess the incidence of piracy on human development and 
its constituents; (2) examine how international, multilateral and bilateral IPRs treaties (laws) 
are instrumental in the effect of piracy on human development and its components. Three 
main findings have been established: (1) piracy has a negative incidence on inequality 
adjusted human development; (2) the unappealing effect of piracy on the HDI is fuelled by the 
‘GDP per capita’ and ‘life expectancy’ components of human emancipation; (3) piracy 
increases the literacy rate. Two major policy implications have been retained from the 
findings. (1) Adherence to international IPRs protection treaties (laws) may not impede per 
capita economic prosperity and could improve life-expectancy. (2) Adoption of tight IPR 
regimes may negatively affect human development by diminishing the literacy rate and 
restricting diffusion of knowledge.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Summary statistics and presentation of countries  
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
  Mean  S.D  Min Max Obser. 
 
Dependent 
Variables  
Human Development Index  1.732 7.191 0.376 45.325 113 
GDP per capita  3.543 0.362 3.012 4.106 121 
Life Expectancy 1.758 0.076 1.622 1.862 110 
Literacy ratio 1.826 0.097 1.572 1.956 110 
       
 
 
Independent 
& Control 
Variables  
Piracy  0.409 0.307 -0.288 0.720 106 
Finance 0.470 0.274 0.139 1.141 110 
Population growth  7.268 0.602 6.074 8.199 121 
Democracy 4.950 3.539 0.000 10.000 121 
Foreign-aid  3.684 5.017 -0.251 24.544 110 
Savings  21.511 12.838 2.754 57.539 106 
       
 
 
 
Instrumental 
Variables  
MainIPlaw 2.256 2.835 0.000 11.000 121 
IPrlaw 1.438 1.944 0.000 7.000 121 
Wipo Treaties 2.735 0.793 2.000 4.000 121 
Mutilateral 9.628 3.304 4.000 17.000 121 
Bilateral 0.322 0.535 0.000 2.000 121 
Lower Middle Income  0.454 0.500 0.000 1.000 121 
Middle Income 0.818 0.387 0.000 1.000 121 
Freedom 0.333 0.474 0.000 1.000 72 
English Common Law 0.545 0.500 0.000 1.000 121 
       
Panel B: Presentation of Countries 
Algeria, Botswana, Cameroon, Egypt,  Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Zambia 
S.D:Standard Deviation. Min:Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obser: Observations.  
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Appendix 2 : Correlation matrix 
Dependent Variables Independent and Control Variables Instrumental Variables  
IHDI GDPp LE LR Piracy Finance Popg Demo Aid Savings MIPlaw IPrlaw Wipo Multila Bilater LMI MI FreeD English  
1.000 0.187 -0.059 0.217 -0.480 0.014 0.106 0.206 -0.130 -0.025 0.834 -0.038 -0.167 -0.294 -0.100 -0.165 0.089 0.365 0.158 IHDI 
 1.000 0.494 0.670 -0.504 0.530 -0.404 0.273 -0.650 0.514 0.332 0.071 -0.273 -0.380 0.034 -0.400 0.578 0.873 0.095 GDPp 
  1.000 -0.033 -0.270 0.870 -0.055 -0.229 -0.532 0.247 -0.127 0.099 0.048 0.278 0.379 0.108 0.448 0.494 -0.508 LE 
   1.000 -0.348 0.136 -0.343 0.356 -0.273 0.334 0.352 -0.393 -0.535 -0.618 -0.164 -0.753 -0.064 0.681 0.539 LR 
    1.000 -0.493 -0.067 -0.217 0.453 0.276 -0.715 -0.017 0.320 0.026 0.015 0.124 -0.289 -0.771 -0.153 Piracy 
     1.000 -0.097 -0.137 -0.480 0.035 0.051 0.217 0.027 0.318 0.337 0.036 0.314 0.659 -0.243 Finance 
      1.000 -0.540 -0.107 -0.141 0.362 0.079 0.178 0.151 0.272 0.437 -0.029 -0.441 -0.246 Popg 
       1.000 0.027 -0.140 0.220 -0.191 -0.001 -0.207 -0.677 -0.599 -0.140 0.660 0.688 Demo 
        1.000 -0.407 -0.305 -0.216 -0.018 0.106 -0.180 -0.010 -0.590 -0.544 0.067 Aid 
         1.000 -0.0005 0.074 -0.294 -0.520 0.124 -0.322 0.302 0.439 -0.093 Savings 
          1.000 0.103 -0.273 -0.221 -0.071 -0.171 0.209 0.498 0.270 MIPlaw 
           1.000 0.0308 0.443 0.143 0.419 0.350 0.022 -0.136 IPrlaw 
            1.000 0.311 -0.052 0.221 -0.157 -0.480 -0.074 Wipo 
             1.000 0.261 0.632 0.063 -0.420 -0.299 Multila 
              1.000 0.475 0.284 -0.267 -0.661 Bilater 
               1.000 0.430 -0.547 -0.633 LMI 
                1.000 0.408 -0.430 MI 
                 1.000 0.408 Free 
                  1.000 English 
                    
IHDI : Inequality adjusted Human Development Index. GDPp: GDP per capita growth. LE: Life Expectancy. LR: Literacy Rate. Popg: Population growth. Demo: Democracy. LMI: Lower Middle Income. MI:Middle 
Income. FreeD: Complete Freedom of the Press. English: English Common Law countries. MIPlaw: Main Intellectual Property law. IPrlaw: Intellectual Property Rights law. Wipo: World Intellectual Property 
Organization. Multila: Multilateral treaties. Bilater: Bilateral treaties.   
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Appendix 3: Variable definitions 
Variables Signs Variable definitions Sources 
    
Human Development   IHDI Inequality adjusted Human Development Index World Bank(WDI) 
    
GDP per capita  GDPpc Log of GDPpc, PPP(International constant dollar 2005) World Bank(WDI) 
    
Life Expectancy  LE Log of Life Expectancy at birth(Total years) World Bank(WDI) 
    
Literacy Rate LR  Log Adult literacy rate(annual % of population aged 
15+) 
GMID 
    
Piracy  Piracy  Piracy rate (annual %) BSA 
    
Financial Depth  Finance  Financial  System Liabilities  World Bank(FDSD) 
    
Population   Growth Popg Population Growth Rate (annual %) World Bank(WDI) 
    
Democracy  Demo Institutionalized  Democracy  World Bank(WDI) 
    
Foreign-aid  Aid Net Official Development Assistance(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI) 
    
Savings  Savings Gross Domestic Savings(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI) 
    
Freedom   Free Press Freedom Quality  Freedom House 
    
Main IP law MIPlaw Main Intellectual Property Law  WIPO 
    
IP rlaw IPrlaw Intellectual Property Rights Law  WIPO 
    
Wipo Treaties Wipo World Intellectual Property Organization Treaties  WIPO 
    
Mutilateral Multiter Multilateral  Treaties  WIPO 
    
Bilateral Bilater Bilateral  Treaties  WIPO 
    
English Common law  English  Countries with English Common Law Tradition 
(Dummy variable, 1 for English and 0, otherwise) 
La Porta (2008, p. 
286) 
    
Lower Middle Income  LM. 
Income 
Countries with income group setting: $1,006-$3,975. Asongu (2014c, p. 
365) 
    
Middle Income  M.Income Countries with income group setting: $1,006-$12,275. Asongu (2014c, p. 
365) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database. BSA: Business Software Alliance.  
GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Log: Logarithm. PPP: Purchasing Power Parity. WIPO: World Intellectual Property Organization. GMID: 
Global Market Information Database.  
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